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STATE OF UTAH 









STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff Denise R. Gramme filed an action in divorce. The 
Defendant Andre Gramme answered and counterclaimed. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court awarded the Plaintiff a divorce on her Complaint 
and also awarded the Defendant a divorce on his Counterclaim. The Trial 
Court found that the value of the marital estate was $650, 000. 00 and 
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awarded to the Plaintiff real and personal property having a l 
va ue o; 
$200, 000. 00, awarded Plaintiff attorney fees of $8 000 00 and 
' · costs, 
and also awarded to the Plaintiff the sum of $1,400.00 per monthallrr· 
The Trial Court awarded to the Defendant real and personal pr ope rt; 
a value of $450, 000. 00, which sum included the value of a corporation 
which the Trial Court found to have a value of $210, 800. 00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm, in: 
entirety, the Decree of Divorce of the Trial Court and asks this Court 
award to Plaintiff the attorney fees incurred by Plaintiff-Respondento: 
Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In order to supplement and, in some instances, to correcttn, 
Defendant-Appellant's Statement of Fae ts, Plaintiff-Respondent submit' 
the following: 
At the time of the trial in this matter, the Plaintiff was 50 ye; 
) The Pl;'.: of age (R. 12 7), and the Defendant was 51 years of age (R. 3 · 
was 19 years of age when she married the Defendant in Seraing, Bel!iu~ 
on July 18, 1946 (R. 128). After the marriage, Defendant entered intc 
. ., I 
partnership with the Plaintiff's father in the potato wholesale busine>-
- 2 -
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The partnership Lasted until 1948, when the parties immigrated to the 
United States. (R. 128). The parties moved to Salt Lake City, Utah, in 
!949, whereupon Plaintiff obtained employment with the Hotel Utah in its 
Laundry. (R. 129). 
During the period of time from 1949 through 1969, there was no 
substantial period of time when Plaintiff was unemployed and her earnings 
were used by the parties for food, utilities and entertainment. (R. 137). 
The type of work performed by Plaintiff during her employment 
included working in a laundry (R. 129), working as a presser (R. 130), 
working in a cleaning establishment (R. 130, 131), working as a spot welder 
in the manufacture of missile heads and as a punch press operator (R. 132), 
and assembling jewelry (R. 134, 135). Between jobs the Plaintiff was never 
unemployed for more than two or three weeks. (R. 227}. 
When the Defendant was starting out in the masonry business, the 
Plaintiff, after work, helped Defendant clean up the job site and prepare 
for the next day's work. (R.137, 138,417). After the Plaintiff terminated 
her outside employment, she worked for the Defendant and assisted him in 
bis business (R. 138, 139). 
According to the records of St. Mark's Hospital (Exhibit 37-D), 
between L969 and 1975, the Plaintiff was admitted to St. Mark's Hospital 
on twelve different occasions: 
- 3 -
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1. On January 15, 1969, Plaintiff was admitted to the, . 
11osp 1 ~ 
and underwent surgery which consisted of a radical mastectomy f 
or la.· 
of the left breast. 
2. On January 27, 1971, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospik 
and underwent surgery which consisted of a simple mastectomy of the: 
breast for fibrocys tic disease and to relieve incapacitating breast pal:, 
3. On April 21, 1972, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital;: 
five days of severe vomiting, dizziness and headache and she underwer 
surgery consisting of a Marshall-Marchetti repair for urinary incontir• 
4. On August 21, 1972, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital 
drug ingestion and urinary incontinence. 
5. On January 8, 1973, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital 
after she had five convulsive seizures in a four-day period, and shew,, 
admitted for the convulsive disorder. 
6. On February 11, 1973, Plaintiff was admitted to the hosri 
and underwent surgery for an anterior vaginal repair, a fasial sling at: 
removal of a foreign body and ovary. 
7. On September 18, 1973, Plaintiff was admitted to the hos~: 
for acute influenza. 
8. On December 5, 1973, Plaintiff was admitted to the ho5r1' 
for generalized tremors, weakness and an anxiety state. 
- 4 -
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9, On February 25, 1974, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital 
and underwent surgery for the removal of a fibrous mass from her abdomen 
and exploratory surgery. 
10. On July 11, 1974, Plaintiff was admitted to ths hospital for 
a severe anxiety reaction. 
11. On April 9, 1975, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for 
an anxiety reaction. 
12. On September 11, l975, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital 
and underwent a cystoscopy operation as well as exploratory surgery. 
The Salt Lake City Fire Department went to the Gramme residence 
concerning fires in the vicinity of the Gramme residence (R.485), and fires 
at the residence (R.486), between May, l973, and June, 1974 (R.488). The 
Plaintiff testified that she was not responsible for any of the fires (R.200). 
Dr. Vern Peterson, a psychiatrist, having served as the President 
of the Utah Psychiatric Association, testified that Plaintiff was admitted 
to St. Mark's Hospital on July 11, 1974, for a severe anxiety reaction due 
to her being obsessed with the loss of femininity and the accusations being 
made at the time that she had started the fires. (R. 573). Dr. Peterson 
also testified that Plaintiff's intense emotional state in 1974 resulted from 
her having a hysterectomy operation at an early age, coupled with her later 
bilateral mastectomies and other surgeries. (R. 576). 
- 5 -
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The Defendant testified that Mrs. Gramme took tra l 
nqu11z,1 
after her operation, which tranquilizers were prescribed by her doctr,· 
(R. 425). Plaintiff testified that she had taken no drugs prior to her 
operation in 1969. (R. 207), and that the drugs she used were 1· f , n act, 
medication. (R. 208). Plaintiff further testified that she had never ii;: 
sleeping pills except in the hospital. (R. 208), 
Dr. Vern Peterson noted on July 11, 1974, on the occasionoi 
the Plaintiff's tenth admission to St. Mark's Hospital, that her social 
history was "insignificant" (Exhibit 37-D), meaning drug abuse, chro~ 
pill taking, and alcohol were insignificant with respect to Mrs. Gram[, 
illness. (R. 586, 587). Dr. Peterson further testified that Plaintillnc 
shown no hint of drug abuse or addiction. (R. 577), and that the costoi 
$60. 00 to $80. 00 for medication per month was reasonable for an indi· 
such as Plaintiff who required such medication. (R. 587). 
Plaintiff has been under the care of Dr. Vern Peterson since 
1974 (R. 574). He has had an opportunity to observe Mrs. Gramme's 
fainting spells, and it was his opinion that the seizures were causedO·: 
intense emotional anxiety and were not feigned in any way. (R. 576,iii 
· · ta'edb·: Plaintiff testified that the drug overdoses were precipi ' 
her cancer (R. 209), and that she had attempted suicide because her bee 
had been mutilated by all of the surgery. (R. 212). The Plaintifi testi.i!' 
· ken with the marriage between the parties was fine until she was stric 
cancer. (R. 212). 
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Defendant testified that he had known Sharon Morecroft for a 
number of years, (R. 40), and that he had started a relationship with her 
beginning in October, 1975. (R. 102). 
The Plaintiff and Defendant separated in September, 1976. (R. 45); 
however, prior to the separation, Defendant had traveled extensively with 
Sharon Morecroft: In November of 1975, he traveled with her to Mazatlan, 
Mexico (R. 42); in February or March, 1976, he traveled with her to San 
Diego, California; in May of 1976, he traveled with her to San Carlos, 
Mexico; in the spring of 1976, he traveled with her to Oroville, California, 
and to Reno, Nevada (R. 46); he traveled with her to Phoenix, Arizona 
(R. 49); and to Carmel, California (R. 54). 
Defendant admitted having been a frequent guest in Sharon More-
croft' s home for dinner (R.45,46), both prior to and after the separation 
of the parties. (R. 46). 
Prior to the separation of the parties, the Defendant maintained 
an apartment in Salt Lake City, Utah, where Sharon Morecroft visited him. 
(R. 50), 
The Defendant had employed Sharon Morecroft in his business 
for approximately one and a half years prior to the trial of this matter. 
(R. 43), The Defendant allowed Sharon Morecroft to use his credit cards 
(R. 51), and a l977 Pontiac automobile which the company had purchased, as 
well as a Corvair automobile owned by the company (R. 311). Defendant 
also allowed Sharon Morecroft to use his membership in the Sports Mall (R. 56, 5i 
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The Defendant admitted to having purchased jewelry and Clo;~ 
for Sharon Morecroft, (R. 43, 44, 45) and on one occasion he showedf 
a gift that he had purchased for Sharon Morecroft (R.147). Addition-' 
"· 
numerous occasions, Defendant refused to stay at home and eat thtm" 
Plaintiff had prepared for him because as he told the Plaintiff, "I'm~_ 
Sharon out to dinner." (R.146). 
Based upon the privilege against self-incrimination, Delendl.l 
refused to answer whether he had had sexual relations with Sharon 
Morecroft. (R. 52). 
Plaintiff stayed at home with the drapes drawn after the Defe~: 
started his relationship with Sharon Morecroft. (R. 171 ). 
Plaintiff testified she had never assaulted a person other thai 
Sharon Morecroft (R. 231 ), whom she assaulted when the Defendant 
returned from California with her in his private airplane. (R. 231). L 
Plaintiff further testified that she attacked Sharon Morecroft in an atterr 
to save her marriage. (R. 235). 
Plaintiff admitted that she had attempted suicide because of~, 
Defendant's relationship with Sharon Morecroft. (R. 212, 213). 
Plaintiff pleaded with the Defendant to terminate his relations: 
withSharonMorecroft. (R.147,233). l t . ship wit: The Defendant's re a ion 
Sharon Morecroft severely damaged the Plaintiff emotionally (R. !49 1. 
which fact the Defendant also acknowledged. (R. 505). 
- 8 -
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The money Plaintiff paid to Mr. House in Carmel, California, 
was for repair of the roof on the boat and for two water tanks at the home. 
(R. 287). Plaintiff had the water storage tanks installed in the Carmel 
home because of the water shortage in California at that time. (R. 305). 
The fire that occurred in the Knolte home was caused by an 
electrical wire under the rug. (R. 200). 
Plaintiff left the Defendant for four or five days in 1949 (R.186), 
on her father's advice (R.187), and lived with another woman (R.187, 188), 
and she denied being involved with another man during that period of time. 
(R. 186 ). At the time Plaintiff purchased the clothe.s in Carmel, California, 
she had no clothes in California and she did not have access to her clothes 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 307, 308). The items of clothing Defendant 
removed from the home in Carmel, California, were purchased by the 
Plaintiff as gifts for various people. (R. 286). 
The Defendant testified that prior to the Plaintiff's operation for 
breast cancer, the difficulties experienced in the marriage were the 
Plaintiff's fainting, the untruth, the bickering with the family. (R. 505). 
Defendant testified that while Plaintiff worked at Hudson Bay 
Company, her clothing purchases would often exceed her week's earnings, 
but that was not characteristic of the years when Plaintiff was employed. 
(R. 468). Plaintiff worked for Hudson Bay in 1952 or 1953, for approxi-
mately 6 to 8 months (R.130). 
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Defendant, under cross examination, admitted that after thei 
was burglarized, wherein guns and jewelry were taken that h h' . 
• e ired, i 
private investigator and as a result, a person named Bob West 
was ar:. 
for the burglary and he admitted having burglarized the home. (R.Sv!. 
Defendant began masonry work as a hod carrier in l949andst:I 
in business for himself as a masonry contractor in 1961 on a part-time 
basis and after a year or two, started in the masonry contracting busiJ:;., 
I 
I 
full time. Andre Gramme Masonry, Inc., was incorporated in 1969. :;I 
Andre Gramme Masonry, Inc., contracts for the masonryww 
commercial buildings including schools and hotels and employs betwee:I 
and 100 employees depending on the number of jobs the company is wor:: 
on at a particular time. (R. 6, 7). Andre Gramme Masonry, Inc., has 
contracted for the masonry work on such buildings as the Language k; 
Center, Provo, Utah, which contract was for $1, 789, 503,00, andtheL'· 
America Hotel in Salt Lake City, Utah, which contract was for $1,028) 
(Exhibit 21-P). 
In 1977, Defendant was named in Contractor's Magazine as Uti 
Masonry Contractor of the Year. (R. 514). 
During the period of time from 1972 through 1976, Andre Gracr~ 
Masonry, Inc., had gross receipts as follows: 
1972 - $480, 908. 85 (Exhibit 15-P) 
1973 - $523,082. 76 (Exhibit 16-P) 
- 10 -
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1974 - $705, 344. 86 (Exhibit 19-P) 
1975 - $1, 432, 904. 94 (Exhibit 17-P) 
1976 - $1,176,052.43 (Exhibit18-P) 
The Trial Court found that the value of the marital estate was 
$650, 000. 00 (Findings, R.124), and awarded to the Plaintiff the home in 
Carmel, California, which both the Plaintiff and Defendant valued at 
$167, 500. 00, the boat in Carmel, California, valued at $5, 000. 00, and 
a Savings Certificate in the amount of $25, 000. 00, and a Datson automobile 
valued at $2, 500. 00 by the Plaintiff (Exhibit 66-P), together with various 
miscellaneous items of personal property which were not included in the 
value of the $650, 000. 00 marital estate. (Exhibit 25-P). 
Defendant was awarded the balance of the $650, 000. 00 marital 
estate, that is, $450, 000. 00 which sum included the home in Salt Lake City, 
Utah; four lots in Park City, Utah; one-fifth interest in a leased home in 
San Carlos, Mexico; one-third interest in a boat in San Girlos, Mexico; 
a Thunderbird automobile; an airplane valued at $27, 000. 00; one-fifth 
interest in real property Located at 1815 West 500 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah; the $75, 000. 00 Savings Certificate with Silver King Bank of Park 
City, Utah; all of his life insurance policies. (Exhibits 66-P and 34-D). 
Additionally, Defendant was awarded the Corporation which the Court found 
to have a value of $210, 800. 00. The Court, therefore, awarded the 
- 11 -
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Defendant personal property totaling $239, 200. 00 together . h 
' W1t the 
Corporation valued at $210, 800. 00. (Findings, R. 124). 
The Defendant valued the corporation at approximately $lZO,: 
as of December 31, 1976, (R. 501); however, the Defendant under cro;. 
examination admitted that his opinion as to the value of the Corporation 
was based upon his accountant's opinion. (R. 519, 520). Mr. Bayes, 
accountant for Defendant, valued the Corporation at $121,000.00. (R,' 
Mr. Bayes' valuation of the Corporation was strictly on a liquidation~, 
(R. 563). 
Both Mr. Bayes and Mr. Gramme, in arriving at their opinioc· 
as to the value of the Corporation, deducted from the net assets of the 
Corporation a stockholder loan (R. 566), which stockholder loantotaleci 
$29,473.00, and the Defendant considered the $29,473.00 tobeapersot 
asset of his (R. 518) since that sum was, in fact, owed to him personall· 
(R. 565). Mr. Bayes admitted that under his method of valuing the Co:· 
poration, i£ the Corporation had earned income which was unreported, 
the value of the Corporation would be increased in the amount of the 
unreported income. (R. 561). Mr. Bayes admitted that he was not an 
expert with respect to valuing small corporations. (R. 549). 
Frank Stewart, President of an economic and management 
· th on tr actor' 
counseling firm (R. 315), who has had much experience w1 c 
e Masonr (R. 316), testified that in his opinion the value of Andre Gramm 
- 12 -
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Inc., as of December 31, 1976, was $342, 900. 00. (R. 333). Mr. Stewart 
further testified that in analyzing the Defendant's performance in the con-
struction business, Defendant was capable of commanding a salary in the 
construction business of $50, 000. 00 per year. (R. 387). 
The Defendant's adjusted gross income for the years 1972 through 
1976, (a five-year period) was approximately $89, 000. 00. During those 
same years, Defendant purchased assets in excess of $300, 000. 00. The 
Defendant, based upon his privilege against self-incrimination, refused to 
answer where he obtained the excess money over his income to purchase 
those assets (R. 89, 90, also Exhibit 43-P and Exhibits 10-P through 14-P). 
Defendant testified that his corporate tax returns reflected a loss 
for 1976; however, during 1976, Defendant personally purchased two Savings 
Certificates totaling $100, 000. 00 at the Silver King State Bank in Park City, 
Utah, on April 1, 1976. (R. 110). In addition, Defendant purchased three 
lots in Park City, Utah, in 1976, for $33, 000. 00 and paid the full purchase 
price in the same year. (R. 24). Also, in April of 1976, Defendant pur-
chased an interest in a home in San Carlos, Mexico, for $13,000. 00, which 
sum was paid in full at the time (R. 30), and at the time Defendant purchased 
the interest in the home in San Carlos, Mexico, he also purchased a one-
third interest in a boat in San Carlos, Mexico, for $3, 000. 00, which sum 
was paid in full in 1976 (R. 31, 32). Defendant also purchased a one-fifth 
- 13 -
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interest in a membership to a country club in San Carlos M . . 
' exico in;: 
(R. 33). Also, in November of 1976, Defendant purchased a f' 
one- i!tr. 
interest in real property located at 1815 West 5th South, Salt Lake Cit' 
Utah, which real property was purchased for $51, 000. 00, and Defend;r 
share was $3, 000. 00. (R. 35, 36). 
During 1976, in addition to Defendant's personal acquisitiono: 
assets, the Corporation purchased a 1977 Pontiac automobile for $1,k 
(R. 54, 55, Exhibit 18-P), and a $17, 080. 50 computer, (Exhibit 18-P). 
Defendant predicted a loss of $150, 000. 00 for the corporation: 
1977; however, again, in 1977, Defendant purchased a lot in Park Cih, 
Utah, for $26, 000. 00 and paid for it in full. (R. 24). 
During the marriage, the parties traveled extensively to Orer 
Las Vegas, Nevada; Carmel, California; Wyoming; Europe, and back: 
(R. 149, 150). The Defendant allowed Plaintiff to spend money freely ic 
151), and the parties annually spent $2, 000. 00 to $3, 000. 00 at Christ~« 
and spent considerable money on their grandchildren and their child.,; 
Mrs. Gramme enjoyed entertaining guests during the marriage. (R.l'; 
h b t · San Carloi The parties owned a private airplane (R. 14) and t e oa s m 
Mexico, (R.16), and Carmel, California (Exhibit 66-P). The parties 
. C l California. employed a gardener to take care of the home in arme • 
- (R. 92). The part'e' which gardening services cost $150. 00 per month. 
had hired a woman for household work in the home in Salt Lake City, 
- 14 -
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Utah, for approximately the last ten or twelve years. (R. 212). The 
parties -were members of several social clubs. (R. 452). 
Plaintiff is physically unable to -work because of pain in her left 
arm, lack of mobility in her left arm, and the fact that she has no feeling in 
her Left hand. (R. 222). She tires very easily and has recurring headaches 
for a period of a week to ten days. (R. 223). Defendant also admitted that 
the Plaintiff's arm limited her physical ability to work. (R. 468, 469). 
Dr. Peterson also testified that he doubted if the Plaintiff was 
presently emotionally prepared to be employed. 
Plaintiff testified that Exhibit 24-P reflected an itemized list of 
monthly expenditures which would sustain Plaintiff at a standard of living 
to which she had become accustomed, (R. 155: 156) and that she had no 
other source of income other than the alimony awarded by the Court. (R.158). 
Plaintiff testified that living in Carmel, California, had greatly 
improved her physical and emotional well-being, and that she had joined 
the French Club in Carmel and goes to the symphony (R. 153, 154). The 
Plaintiff testified that she had not found it necessary to use tranquilizors 
while living in Carmel, California (R. 158, 218). 
Defendant also testified that the Plaintiff's physical and emotional 
well-being had improved since she had lived in Carmel, California (R .. 506). 
Dr. Peterson testified that he has observed a change in Plaintiff since she 
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has resided in Carmel, California, which he described as " quite 
remarkable" in that she was much more calm, physically she had,,_ 
bQ· 
weight, and her general appearance had greatly improved. ( R. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT UNDERSTOOD AND PROPERLY APPLIED THL 
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
The Defendant-Appellant, in his Brief, cites the record, spe: 
cally the dialogue between the Trial Court and Defendant's Counselan: 
alleges certain facts not in the record which transpired in chambers: 
support his position that the Trial Court failed to consider the miscoo·i. 
of the wife or the relative guilt or innocence of the parties in makingfr 
award of alimony. However, it is essential to point out that the Tria: 
Court's statements and comments on the record were made inthefm 
work of the Defendant's position that the Plaintiff had, by her conduct 
forfeited her right to alimony. Although the Defendant's Counselmec•I 
relative guilt or innocence in his statements, the Court's statementsc 
not directed to the element of relative guilt, but were directed towara: 
theory of forfeiture. 
After the Trial Court sustained Plaintiff's objection to Defeoi: 
d . the ho sp1t1 question to the Plaintiff concerning events that occurre in 
ttrar.::' 
the following dialogue between Defendant's Counsel and the Cour 
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A 11 right. Suppose you show the attack. (R. 240) 
Excuse me. (R. 240) 
Suppa se you show that. What then? What does 
it prove so far as this case is concerned? (R. 240) 
The conduct of the wife, Your Honor, the 
misconduct of the wife. (R. 240). 
Objection is sustained. You see, we can go into 
all sorts of peripheral things. We have gone back 
now 20 or 30 years, and I'm not sure what you 
are claiming for all of that. (R. 241) (Emphasis 
added). 
At this point the Court was concerned about the relevance of 
matters peripheral to the issues that were before the Court. Further on 
in the dialogue between Defendant's Counsel and the Court, Defendant's 




So what you are saying is old misconduct affects 
the amount of alimony. (R. 242) 
I am saying that what it does is to alleviate the 
presumption that was raised by the---not a 
presumption, it doesn't rise to that point, but 
the really basic principle of the Alldredge case 
is that alimony will, in most cases, be denied 
if the wife is guilty of gross or pro longed 
immoral conduct. And I'm saying that I am 
attempting to establish that the mitigating 
circumstance which the Court provided for 
in the Alldredge case does not exist in this 
circumstance be cause the misconduct is of 
long origin. (R. 242) (Emphasis added). 
That is the position you are taking in this case? 
(R. 242) (Emphasis added). 
- l 7 -
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MR. ALLRED: That is a position that I am taking in th:, 
Your Honor. (R. 242) (Emphasis a~ 









(Referring to the Alldredge case) It has·. 
widely nationally cited, and I think that':·. 
of McDonald vs. McDonald, and also tb;·. 
case of Anderson vs. Anderson, where •. ·. 
Court, speaking per curium, talks abou;~. 
importance of testimony pertaining to reta: 
guilt or innocence of the parties. (R.Z~~.:. 
As it goes to effect a denial of alimonv' 
(Emphasis added). 
As it goes to effect a denial of alimony, o: 
goes to effect the amount of awarded alim:: 
your Honor, both. (R. 245) • 
. . . and that case is cited at Amjur, yourH::I 
this proposition: 'It has been held that in: 
sidering· the equities upon granting a divnr:' 
the husband, if the Court finds that the~~'­
been guilty of gross or prolonged immora: 
duct, then an award of alimony to the w:ie-
be denied in most cases.' 
That represents the central position takcc'. 
Alldredge case. (R. 250) 
What do you suppose the language "gross~: 
prolonged immoral conduct" means? (R..: 
Excuse me? (R. 250). 
"gross Jr What do you support the language 
1
, 
d t " ns 0 (R-·· prolonged immoral con uc mea 
1 uilt or inno;: ... I am saying that re at1ve g 
b of factor: 
of the parties is one of a n~~"'e::tving th£:, 
considered by the Co:.irt. ~--i 
. . al m1son. 
wife is ouilty of prolonged 1mmor ~
o - - f . ture as·'· 
that she may be subject to a for ei ~i 
alimony is concerned. (R. 253) (Empha,,,. 
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Even though her needs and abilities of both 
parties might require something different but for 
that prolonged and immoral misconduct? (R. 255). 
Well, Your Honor, I'm not saying that should 
necessarily be the case, but I'm saying that the 
Court has the power to consider the misconduct 
of the wife as an element respecting a total 
forfeiture, or the Court has the power to take 
the position that if misconduct of the wife is 
serious and pro longed that it can be a partial 
forfeiture. (R. 255) 
Of course, in Aldrich v. Aldrich, when the Court 
was looking at that question, they said the wife 
shall have alimony in this case. (R. 256) 
That's perfectly clear. (R. 256) 
All right. B·ut you see, you are throwing some terms 
out and you are saying they don't mean what they 
appear to mean. By "grossly prolonged immoral 
conduct or misconduct", can you point to any case 
where the Court has denied alimony for gross or 
prolonged immoral conduct where the conduct is 
of the nature that you are alluding to here? 
(R. 256) (Emphasis added). 
Yes, I can. McDonald v. McDonald (R. 256). 
Further in the dialogue, the Court asked Defendant's Counsel to make 
a proffer of proof as to what his evidence would show and the proffer of 
proof was made at R. 260, at which point the Court stated: 
THE COURT: 
MR. ALLRED: 
Are you claiming that the conduct in the hospital 
is evidence of gross or prolonged immoral 
conduct? (R. 260) 
Am I claiming that? I think it relates to the 
conduct of Mrs. Gramme during the period of 
the marriage. (R. 261). 
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I didn't lay down what the rules w 
ere ar· 
I'm just quoting the language that ' · You quc 
from the cases, and that is "gros 
s or p·,. 
longed immoral conduct". It's not· ·· )Ust al 
conduct, it's not just grossly prolongedcc 
duct, it's grossly prolonged immoral con,: 
And that's the adjective that is used IOIT.rr 
the word "conduct". It is immoral conduc· 
Is it your contention that that conduct up:: 
constitutes gross immoral conduct? (R,i· 
••• Your Honor, you must understand sorr-
1 
too: My client isn't here trying to avoidic 
responsibilities. You must simplyundern 
that we ar~ trying to .Pu~ this in a decent:it 
that there is legal principle that permits; 
feiture under circumstances where the co. 
finds--Okay. (R. 263) (Emphasis added). 
And that's what he is asserting, is thatb1· 
virtue of this conduct during the courseoi 
the marriage she ought to be deemed to ha. 
forfeited her right to support for the rem[ 
of her life? (R. 263) (Emphasis added). 
If that is not your position, then, why are· 
going through this? (R. 263) 
That was not what I was asking. I wantlU 
why you are here asserting a position t~ 
stitutes total forfeiture. That's what~ 
asserting. (R. 264) (Emphasis added). 
Defendant's Counsel summarized his position to the TrialCor 
with respect to his theory of forfeiture at P. 266 of the Record; howe'.c 
. f l t' e 'uilt Defendant in his summation failed to mention the is sue o re a iv ' 
. h ct to the but spoke solely concerning his theory of forfeiture wit respe 
relevance of the evidence he was trying to introduce. 
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As is set forth in the above dialogue, the context in which the 
Trial Court made its statements concerned the Defendant's position that 
Plaintiff, because of her conduct, had forfeited her right to alimony. The 
issue of relative guilt or innocence as bearing on an award of alimony was 
not directly raised in that dialogue and the Trial Court at no point in the 
record stated that relative guilt or innocence of the parties in causing 
the break up of the marriage was not a factor to be considered by the 
Trial Court. In addition, Appellant in his Brief has chosen to submit facts 
to this Court not in the record: 
"In that dialogue, the Court said, indirectly on the record 
what it had said, more directly, in chambers. Alimony, the 
Court reasoned, was to be determined with reference to the 
economic factors and was, in the instant case, in its entirety, 
an economic judgment." (Appellant's Brief, p. 20 ). 
Although Plaintiff submits that the reference to facts off the record 
may be improper, Plaintiff is compelled to respond to such a statement. 
Plaintiff's Counsel has no recollection of the Trial Court having 
stated in Chambers that relative guilt was not to be considered or that the 
Trial Court's decision would be based solely on economic considerations 
and Plaintiff submits that the dialogue in the chambers, again, solely 
involved Defendant's theory of forfeiture. 
Plaintiff readily concedes that the relative guilt or innocence of 
the parties in causing a break up of the marriage was a factor to be con-
sidered by the Trial Court. In fact, during the trial of this matter, the 
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Plaintiff cited the cases of Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Ut. 2d, 79, 296 P.z~ 
Searle v. Searle (Utah, 1974) 522 P. 2d 697, for the proposition that:, 
guilt or innocence was, indeed, a factor that the Court may consider:: 
rendering its decision. (R. 524). 
It is important to note that at the point in time, during the t:t 
when the dialogue transpired between the Trial Court and Defendant's 
Counsel relative to Defendant's theory of forfeiture, the Trial Court:, 
already heard the testimony of the Defendant himself concerning hisrr. 1 
involving Sharon Morecroft, and the Court had properly concluded at:: 
point in time that this case was distinguishable from Alldredge v. Alh:l 
119 Utah 504, 229 P. 2d 681, wherein the wife alone was guilty ofmisc:1 
The facts before the Trial Court at that time clearly indicated thatgm. 
may lie with both parties as was the situation in English v. English\l: 1 
565 P. 2d 409, cited by the Trial Court, wherein both of the partiesw,· 
granted the divorce. 
The Defendant in his Brief assumes that the principle of for!:: 
discussed in Alldredge v. Alldredge applies to the instant case. Dum. 
trial of this matter, Defendant took the position that Plaintiff's conduc 
should result in a total forfeiture of alimony. (See for example Deie~:: 
Exhibit 67). Again, in this appeal, the Defendant is, in effect, askin< 
f h f cts and ci:· Court for a total forfeiture, without considering all o t e a 
cumstances present. 
· 5 that ti This Court has stated on many occasion 
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firm rule can be uniformly applied in all divorce cases, and each case 
must be determined on the basis of the immediate fact situation before 
the Court. Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Ut. 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 (1956). Even 
the Court in Alldredge applied this flexible standard to the facts and cir-
cumstances of that case. In Alldredge, the Court concluded that the facts 
and circumstances presented to the Court did not warrant applying the 
theory of forfeiture that was discussed therein. Likewise, the facts and 
circumstances of the instant case do not justify a forfeiture as urged by 
the Defendant. In the Alldredge case, the Plaintiff (husband) who was 64 
years of age, was granted the divorce against the Defendant (wife), who was 
53 years of age. All of the property that the parties owned consisted of a 
home and $400. 00 in a bank account. Plaintiff had a monthly income from 
labor of approximately $200. 00. The Supreme Court concluded that the 
wife's conduct did not rise to the level of gross or prolonged immoral con-
duet. However, the Court also acknowledged the flexible standard that is 
to be applied in all divorce cases wherein it stated: 
The nature of the misconduct of the wife is for consideration 
as an aid to judicial discretion in deciding whether the wife 
should have alimony on divorce, and, if so, the amount thereof. 
Other considerations, such as years of living and toiling together,·,. 
interruptions of this way of life by dibilities not the fault of either 
~ •. become a part of the picture to be viewed as a whole in 
deciding the best thing to be done. Alldredge v. Alldredge, 119 Utah 
504, 229 P. 2d 681 (Emphasis added). 
In the Alldredge case, the other considerations which the Court 
considered were: The Defendant had no skills which she could apply in 
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... 
order to make herself a living; there was no evidence that the Wifec 
separate income and she was 53 years of age, and it seemed l'k l 
l e y le.: 
would not be able to support herself. There was evidence that the 
in ill health. Many of these same factors are present in the instant. 
Considering all of the factors, the Court in Alldredge concluded that 
was entitled to alimony. 
It is submitted that the Alldredge case in its essence represt: 
the standards which have long since been applied to divorce cases in" 
State, that is, misconduct, together with all the facts and circumstanc· 
of the. case are to be considered by the Court. In the instant case, as 
hereinabove mentioned, it is critical to note that Plaintiff (wife) was a:.1 
the divorce as well as the Defendant and that her conduct cannot beisc. 
and viewed in terms of the language of the Alldredge case wherein the 
husband alone was awarded the divorce. The conduct of the PlaintiJJr 
be considered in light of the conduct of the Defendant. In other word;, 
relative guilt or innocence of the parties in causing a break up ol therrl 
An examination of the facts relevant to the issue of the realct 
·aae·I 
guilt or innocence of the parties in causing a break up of the marn' · 
the following: 
The Defendant blamed the fires that occurred at the residence 
. ti' n De an Calli: Cortez Street, on the Plaintiff and to support this pos1 o • 
· t Plain~ 
testified that there was enough evidence to file charges agains 
- 24 -
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(R. "189). However, Plaintiff denied that she was responsible for any of the 
fires. (R. 200). It is also important to note that according to the testimony 
of Dean Callister, the fires occurred over a relatively short period con-
sidering the length of the marriage, that is, for approximately a 13-month 
pedod between May, 1973, and June, 1974. (R. 488). The last fire occurred 
almost two and a half years before the parties separated. (R. 45). 
The Defendant blamed Plaintiff for the burglaries occurring in their 
own residence. (R. 432). However, under cross examination, Defendant 
admitted that after the home was burglarized in which the guns and jewelry 
were taken, that he hired a private investigator and as a result, a person 
named Bob West was arrested for the burglaries and he admitted having 
burglarized the home. (R. 503, 504). 
Prior to the Plaintiff's surgery for breast cancer in 1969 (Exhibit 
37-D), the Defendant testified that the difficulties he had experienced in the 
marriage were the Plaintiff's fainting, the untruths, the bickering with the 
family. (R. 505). 
The Defendant in his Statement of Facts states: 11 The Plaintiff 
was a regular drug user and began taking them as early as 1949 or 1950. 
They included sleeping pills and tranquilizers. 11 (Appellant's Brief, page 10). 
The specific testimony from which Defendant arrives at that 
statement is as follows: 
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What can you tell us, Mr. Gramm 
e, abri 
when the use 0£ drugs began and wh 1." a 11 '. 
consisted 0£ through the years. · 
Well, at the earliest stages, she to k 1 0 ' ' believe, mostly sleeping pills, Sominex 
type 0£ thing. (Emphasis addedi:--· 
How long ago did that begin? 
Oh, as far as back as I can remember, 
Okay, will you describe then how that ma, 
itself over the years? 
Well, I don't know exactly what she wast 
before her operation, but I know she was 
some type 0£ tranquilizer. I never did 101 
it that deeply. Then after her operation1 
take some tranquilizers prescribed tohe1 
doctor and her doctor, and subsequentlyo 
psychiatrist. She took many, 4 or 5 other 
I don't know what they are, but I just beca 
alarmed when she took overdoses of it. (R 
426) (Emphasis added). 
On the other hand, the Plainti££ testified that the marriagew; 
until she was stricken with cancer. (R.164, 165). Plaintiff also testiJi. 
she had never taken sleeping pills except in the hospital. (R.208). Dr 
Peterson testified that Plainti££ had shown no hints 0£ drug abuse oral 
(R. 577), and that a cost 0£ $60. 00 to $80. 00 a month for her medicatio 
not excessive £or an individual such as Plainti££ requiring such mediCJI 
(R. 587). 
Dr. Peterson further testified that the Plaintiff had a difficult 
h d an 
adjusting to the bilateral mastectomies (R. 576), and that he had a 
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opportunity to observe Mrs. Gramme's fainting spells and that it was his 
opinion that the seizures were caused by intense emotional anxiety and 
were not feigned in any way. (R. 576, 577). 
The Defendant further testified that Plaintiff has threatened him 
with a knife and at times he slept in the bathroom (R. 454). However, the 
Defendant admitted that the times he slept in the bathroom because of 
insecurity were after he had started his relationship with Sharon Morecroft 
(R. 454, 455). 
The conduct of the Defendant which Plaintiff asserted caused a 
break up of the marriage revolved around the Defendant's relationship with 
Sharon More croft. As the Appellant noted in his Brief: "The relationship 
of the Defendant with Mrs. Morecroft was not, Defendant testified, secret or 
clandestine." (Appellant's Brief, p. 15 ). 
Plaintiff readily admits that the Defendant's relationship with 
Sharon Morecroft was not secret or clandestine. To the contrary, it was 
flagrant. During the same period of time that the Defendant was living 
with the Plaintiff, he traveled extensively with Sharon Morecroft: to Mazatlan, 
Mexico (R. 42); to San Diego, California (R. 42); to San Carlos, Mexico (R. 41); 
to Oroville, California and Reno, Nevada (R. 46); to Phoenix, Arizona (R. 49); 
and to Carmel, California (R. 54), while the Plaintiff stayed home with her 
drapes drawn. (R.171) (and Appellant's Brief, p. 10). Defendant maintained 
an apartment in Salt Lake City where Sharon Morecroft visited him. (R. 50). 
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Defendant was a frequent guest in Sharon Morecroft' s home f ct· 
or lll!t· 
(R. 45). The Defendant purchased jewelry and clothing for Sharon 
(R. 43, 44, 45), and on one occasion Defendant showed a gift to Plaintii 
he had purchased for Sharon Morecroft. (R. 147). On numerous occ;, 
Defendant refused to stay at home and eat meals that Plaintiff had pr;, 
for him because, he told the Plaintiff, "I am taking Sharon out to di~ 
(R.146). Based upon the privilege against self-incrimination, De!en': 
refused to answer whether he had had sexual relations with SharonMc 
croft (R. 52). 
In spite of Defendant's knowledge of Plaintiff's highly emotioc 
state due to her being obsessed with the loss of femininity (R. 573), lli 
Defendant chose to publicize to the Plaintiff his relationship with Share 
Morecroft. Plaintiff pleaded with the Defendant to terminate his relltl 
with Sharon Morecroft. (R.14 7, 233 ). The Defendant continued his rek· 
ship with Sharon Morecroft for more than a year prior to the timetne:J 
separated. (R. 213). In light of the Defendant's continued relationsrud 
Sharon Morecroft, the Plaintiff had no choice but to seek this divorce. 
The Trial Court considered the relative guilt or innocenceoi: 
parties and in light of the relative conduct of the parties set forth abo·.i 
. . h £ lt nd graoti the Trial Court found that each of the parties was wit au a 
Plaintiff the divorce as well as the Defendant. The Trial Court conside: 
- 28 -
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the parties relative guilt or innocence and the Trial Court's di vision of 
assets and award of alimony in light of the relative guilt of the parties as 
well as all of the other considerations discussed later in this Brief is 
supported by the facts and is equitable. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S WITNESSES. 
Appellant asserts that the Trial Court committed legal error and 
abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of Defendant's witnesses. 
The Trial Court based its ruling upon Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence which provides: 
Except as in these Rules otherwise provided, the Judge may 
in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues 
or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise 
a party who has not had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that 
such evidence would be offered. (Emphasis added). 
In deciding to exclude Defendant's preferred testimony, the Trial 
Court was very careful not to exclude evidence that had not previously been 
presented to the Court. This is reflected in the following dialogue between 
the Trial Court and Defendant's Counsel: 
MR. ALLRED: Well, Your Honor, I will characterize that in 
the context of a proffer of proof. And I suppose 
in connection with the proffer the Court can 
determine if there is evidence that should come 
in with these witnesses. (R. 529) 
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Well, now, all I want you to do is t 11 . e ~ 
what you intend to offer that is ne;---'"' 
. 'th;· 
something that has not been prese~ 
that has not already been testified-..,t · ·.
• 0 lnt' five days that we have been in trial?' 
(Emphasis added). - ·'" 
I know you don't, and that's why I amt,, 
difficult time understanding why you can:. 
simply what new evidence you intend tot 
duce through these witnesses, if any. (R, 
(Emphasis added). 
Okay. The problem with that, Your H°''· 
that Mrs. George's testimony will takeo:, 
mately, say 45 minutes to an hour, and;, 
asking me to crystalize or capsulize inq 
what I expect to elicit by way 0£ testimon,, 
say, an hour. But I will try. (R. 531) 
Following the above dialogue, Defendant's Counsel rnadehi;:I 
of proof and theTrial Court later stated: 
THE COURT: ... I don't want to cut off either side--il. 
have got additional evidence that is notc·~J 
I want you to understand that you haveai. 
opportunity to present that on both sides,. 
(R535) (Emphasis added). 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence empowers the Trial(:. 
exclude evidence if it finds the probative value of the evidence is outwd 
by an undue consumption of time. Defendant ave red to the Trial Couri. 
Mrs. George's testimony would take 45 minutes to an hour. There is: 
showing in the Record that the other two witnesses' testimonywoutH: 
been any shorter. Assuming each witness would have undergone direc: 
. . h r the pre" 
examination for one hour and cross exam1nat1on for one ou • 
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testimony would have consumed a full day and it may have necessitated the 
Plaintiff calling other family members for rebuttal. The Trial Court 
found that the proferred testimony was cumulative or corroborative and 
would necessitate an undue consumption of time. (R. 528). 
The Trial Court was very careful not to exclude evidence concerning 
new facts. The Appellant in his Brief makes no assertion that his proferred 
testimony would have included new facts but only that it "would have added 
materially to the weight and clarity of the evidence. 11 (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 36, 37). 
As is indicated by the above dialogue, Defendant's proferred 
evidence was cumulative and had little probative value: 
Even though proferred evidence is otherwise relevent to the 
issues in a case, it will n.ot be considered relevent and material 
and, therefore, admissible, when it is merely surplusage or 
cumulative and is consequently unnecessary to the proper deter-
mination of the case. ( 29 AmJur 2d Evidence, page 307) 
As the above quotation indicates, cumulative evidence is not 
considered relevant and material and is consequently unnecessary for a 
proper determination of the case. 
The Appellant in his Brief has failed to make a showing as to how 
the excluded testimony would have changed the Trial Court's decision. Even 
in a situation where proper evidence is erroneously excluded, the judgment 
Will not be reversed unless the excluded evidence would have had a sub-
stantial influence in bringing about a different finding upon which the 
judgment is based. 
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Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the 
judgment or decision based thereon be reversed by _ 
, rea::ion 
of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a) it ap pearo 
of record that the proponent of the evidence either made knc.· 
the substance of the evidence in a form and by a method aic: 
by the Judge, or indicated the substance of the expected e~ci-· 
by questions indicating the desired answers, and (b) the co,' 
which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is oitoe 
opinion that the excluded evidence would probably have had; 
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict or 
finding. 
Plaintiff submits that Defendant's proferred testimony wast 
relevant because of its cumulative nature; that the Trial Court acted-
the bounds of the discretion given the Trial Court pursuant to RuleL 
that the excluded testimony would not have changed the Trial Court's 'l 
and Judgment. 
POINT THREE 
THE DECREE IS FAIR AND EQUITABLE AND SHOULD BE AFFIR~::: 
A. THE ALLOCATION OF THE PROPER TY AND THE AWc 
OF ALIMONY WAS FAIR AND EQUITABLE UNDER THE FACTS OF~ 
CASE. 
The Defendant asserts that the Trial Court's decision with:e; 
to the division of assets was inequitable. However, Defendant hasfi·' 
show, in light of all the criteria set forth by this Court in Anders~'· 
· · · t ble T~e Anderson, and Wilson v. Wilson, why the Decree is mequi a · 
Plainti'.!' 1 
Defendant looks solely to the amount of property awarded the 
d d ·1 
any reference whatsoever to the fact that the Defendant was aware,., 
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approximately 2 l/4th times what the Plaintiff was awarded. That is, the 
Plaintiff was awarded property valued at approximately $200, 000. 00, and the 
Defendant was awarded property valued at approximately $450, 000. 00 
(Exhibit 66-P). Therefore, the Plaintiff was awarded approximately 32% 
of the marital estate while the Defendant was awarded approximately 68% 
of the marital estate. 
In Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut. Zd 286, 422 P. Zd 192 (1967), this 
Court stated that: 
The Court's responsibility is to endeavor to provide a just and 
equitable adjustment of their economic resources so that the 
parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy, useful basis. 
In doing so, it is necessary for the Court to consider, in addition 
to the relative guilt or innocence of the parties, an appraisal of 
all of the attendant facts and circumstances: The duration of the 
marriage; the age of the parties; their social position and stan-
dards of living; their health; considerations relative to children; 
the money and property they possess and how it was acquired; 
their abilities and training and their present potential income. 
The Defendant in asserting that the Decree is inequitable has failed 
to address a majority of the considerations set forth above. 
Applying the standards of Anderson to the facts of the instant case, 
it is clear that the Trial Court's decision was equitable. 
Duration of the Marriage: The parties have been married for 31 years. 
Age of the Parties: At the time of the hearing, the Plaintiff was 
50 years old and the Defendant was 51 years old. 
Social positions and Standards of living: The parties have enjoyed 
a relatively high standard of living as is indicated by the frequency that the 
parties traveled, which travel included many trips to Las Vegas, Nevada; 
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Oregon; Carmel, California; and to Wyoming. Further, the partie; 
to Eur ope and the Plaintiff traveled back East for a period of a 
PPt[·. 
three weeks. The extent of the parties' travel is further indicated: 
number of vacations that the Defendant took with Sharon Morecroit. _ 
Addition, the parties enjoyed the use of a private airplane valued a::. 
(Exhibit 34-D). Plaintiff was allowed to spend money freely and the:. 
annually spent between $2, 000. 00 and $3, 000. 00 on Christmas. Tt: 
owned a boat in San Carlos, Mexico, as well as a boat in Carmel, c_ 
The parties were able to maintain the residence in Salt Lake City,::: 
residence in Carmel, California, as well as owning an interest in lo' 
vacation home in San Carlos, Mexico. The parties could afford a go: 
for their home in Carmel, California, which cost over $150. 00 a rr.o: 
and for the past 10 or 12 years, they could afford to hire a.woman to: 
with the housework in the home in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The health of the parties: The Defendant is in good health: 
the record is clear that the Plaintiff is in poor health as the resultc:: 
numerous operations that she has undergone between 1969 and 1975. 
testified that due to the surgery for breast cancer, she has little mo::· 
her left arm and no feeling in her left hand and is unable to work (R.:. 
. . . f k t ten da \'S : She tires easily and has recurring headaches or a wee 0 · 
Dr. Peterson also testified that Plaintiff was not capable of emploi·rr.: 
at the present time (R. 578). 
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The Money and Property they Possess and how it was Acquired: 
The record is clear that neither of the parties brought into the marriage any 
assets, the Plaintiff having worked for her father prior to the marriage and 
the Defendant having entered into a partnership with the Plaintiff's father 
in Belgium after the marriage. The evidence is also clear that Plaintiff 
worked during a substantial period of the marriage and that her income 
was used for utilities and groceries and eutertainrnent of the parties. Both 
Plaintiff and Defendant testified that Plaintiff terminated her employment at 
the request of the Defendant (R. 416, 135). The evidence is also clear that 
the marital estate is substantial ($650, 000.00) and that the Trial Court's 
property award to the Plaintiff was substantially the Savings Certificate 
and the home in Carmel, California, while the property award to the Defen-
dant included virtually all of the parties' investments: the lots in Park City; 
the home in Salt Lake; the airplane, the interest in the home in San Carlos, 
Mexico, the Commercial property, the $75, 000 savings certificate (Exhibit 
66-P), as well as the corporation which is capable of generating substantial 
sums of money so that Defendant's estate will continue to grow while the 
Plaintiff is presently in a position where she must conserve and her assets 
are not likely to increase. 
The Abilities and Training of the Parties and their Present and 
Potential Incomes: The record is clear that the Plaintiff has no special 
skills which would qualify her for employment which did not involve physical 
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labor and the record is also clear that the Plaintiff is physically c.n; 
perform physical labor (R. 222, 578). Plaintiff's potential incomeir 
future will be restricted almost entirely to the Court's award ol aim 
and to the interest she can earn on the $25, 000. 00 savings certilica:, 
awarded to her. On the other hand, the Defendant was awarded the 
corporation which is capable of generating substantial income tohirr., 
if the past is any indication of the corporation's future growth (groso 
1972 - $480, 908. 85, as compared to $1, 176, 052. 43 in l976), the Deie:. 
can expect a substantial increase in his income in the future. Furtk 
Plaintiff's expert witness Frank Stewart, testified that the Defendan!' 
capable of earning a salary in the construction business of $50,000.0. 
annually at the present time. 
Other Factors: Due to the Plaintiff's history of cancer as:· 
as her numerous other physical disabilities, it is entirely possible a:: 
bable that the Plaintiff will require medical attention in the future. E 
as the Plaintiff testified, because of her history of cancer, the caste. 
insurance is prohibitive to her (R.158), and she is virtually selfinsuri 
The Plaintiff must, therefore, look to her own estate to pay medical: 
that may be incurred in the future. 
In light of the above considerations, the Trial Court was obh: 
ic:i' 
endeavor to provide a just and equitable adjustment of the econorn 
h PY ana. 
of the parties so that they could reconstruct their lives on a ap 
basis. Anderson v. Anderson (Supra). With this responsibility inrr.::' 
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Trial Court in awarding the home to Plaintiff in Carmel, California, 
undoubtedly gave great weight to the Plaintiff's testimony that she desired 
to live in Carmel, California (R. 154, 155); that she had not found it necessary 
to take tranquilizers while living in Carmel, California; that she has felt 
very good since living in Carmel; and that her physical and emotional well 
being have greatly improved. Prior to the trial of this matter, the Plaintiff 
had already began to reconstruct her life in Carmel, California. Plaintiff 
speaks French fluently and has joined the French Club in Carmel and goes 
to the symphony often. It is also important to note that the Defendant testified 
that the Plaintiff's general emotional state had improved since she had been 
living in Carmel (R. 506). Also, Dr. Vern Peterson testified that he had 
observed a change in Plaintiff since she had resided in Carmel, which he 
described as "quite remarkable" in that she was much more calm, physically 
she had gained weight, and her general appearance had greatly improved 
(R. 578). 
The Decree that the Court fashioned also allows the Defendant to 
continue his Life virtually undisturbed from what it was prior to the divorce. 
Defendant was awarded property valued in excess of $450, 000. 00 (Exhibit 66-P). 
Defendant was awarded the home in Salt Lake City; the vacation home in San 
Carlos, Mexico; his private airplane; the lots in Park City, Utah; the $75, 000. 00 
savings certificate, as well as the corporation which generates substantial 
income so that his assets will continue to grow. (See Statement of Facts, 
this Brief, page 10-11). 
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This Court has stated in the case of Searle v. s 
earle, Ctah, 
522 P. 2d 697 (1974): 
Although it is both the duty and prerogative of this 
court 
in a case of equity to review the facts as well as the law 
Article VIII, Section 9, Constitution of Utah, the trial j~d e 
has considerable latitude of discretion in adjusting the fin~( 
and property interests in a divorce case. The actions of the. 
trial court are indulged with a presumption of validity, and~ 
burden is upon appellant to prove such a serious inequity as: 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. There is no fixed rule 
or formula for the division of property; Section 30-3-5, c,c, 
1953, provides that when a decree of divorce is made the Cc. 
may make such orders in relation to property as may be 
equitable. The trial court has a responsibility to endeavor 
to provide a just and equitable adjustment of their economic 
resources so that the parties might reconstruct their lives 
on a happy and useiu.l basis. 
As is set forth above, the Trial Court in this case is empowe: 
with a broad discretion and his actions are indulged with a presumptic 
validity. The Trial Court's decision with respect to the property di·i.: 
was equitable and well within its broad discretion and the Trial Gour: 
decision fulfilled its responsibility to equitably divide the assets ina 
manner to assist the parties in reconstructing their lives. 
B. THE AWARD OF ALilv10NY WAS EQUITABLE AND!SSl: 
PORTED BY THE FACTS. 
The Defendant asserts in his Brief that the award of alimony! 
Plaintiff was inequitable and that Plaintiff should be denied alimony be: 
of the property award made to her. Defendant's argument totally igni: 
· · g the amoc:· 
the standards that this Court has established in determmin 
alimony as they apply to the facts of this case: 
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--
" ... The amount of alimony is measured by the wife 1 s needs and 
requirements, considering her station in life, and upon the 
husband's ability to pay." English v. English (Utah, 1977) 
565 P. 2d 409. Henricks v. Hendrick!j 91 Utah 553, 63 P. 2d 277 (1936) 
Plaintiff testified that the monthly expenditures set forth in 
Exhibit 24-P, which totaled $1, 545. 00 would sustain her at the standard to 
which she had become accustomed. (An examination of the facts concerning 
the standard of living is set forth in pages 33 and 34 of this Brief. The Court 
awarded Plaintiff $1, 400. 00 a month alimony. It is important to note that 
at no time during the trial did the Defendant cross examine the Plaintiff as 
to her requirements and the amount of alimony she would need for those 
requirements. Further, Defendant introduced absolutely no evidence to 
show that he was unable to pay $1, 400. 00 per month alimony. In fact, it 
would have been entirely reasonable for the Trial Court to conclude that 
the Defendant's income for the year immediately preceding the divorce 
(1976) was in excess of $150, 000. 00 as is evidenced by the amount of money 
the Defendant spent for assets that were acquired in that year (see pages 13-
14 of this Brief). 
Defendant thwarted every effort of the Plaintiff to establish the 
Defendant's true income. Based upon his privilege against self-incrimination, 
Defendant refused to answer where or how he obtained the money to purchase 
assets totaling over $300, 000. 00. The purchases were made during the 
years 1972 through 1976, when during the same period his adjusted gross 
income was approximately $89, 000. 00. (R. 89, 90). 
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Plaintiff's expert witness Frank Stewart, testiiied that'ii;,· 
Defendant's past performance, he could presently command a sa!a: 
--
construction business 0£ $50, 000. 00 annually (R. 387). 
In his Brie£, Defendant argues that the case 0£ Dubois.,,:.: 
29 Ut.2d 75, 504P.2d1380 (1973), supports his contentionthattheF:. 
in the instant case should be required to live on the income that~ 
produced from the value 0£ the property awarded to her. However,: 
facts 0£ the Dubois case are clearly distinguishable from the facts it 
instant case. In the Dubois case, the Court found the marital estate:. 
a value 0£ $588, 581. 00 and the Court awarded the Plaintiff (wife) app:. 
mately 60o/c 0£ the marital estate, whereas in the instant case the Co•i: 
awarded Plaintiff approximately 32% 0£ the marital estate. The wile. 
the Dubois case, after the action was filed, became a beneficiary to; 
stantial estate and she had an expectancy in the estate of her mother'' 
still living but 0£ an advanced age. There has been no showing of sue: 
in the instant case. The nucleous 0£ the marital estate in the~:. 
was the result of investments 0£ gifts from the Plaintiff's relatives,"' 
in the instant case the marital estate was acquired during the marria;: 
through the joint efforts of the parties. In addition, in the Dub~"'' 
there is no showing that the husband had a substantial income as is t:.: 
this case. Further, the inference from a reading of the Dub~opiniC: 
the property awarded to the Plaintiff was income producing properr,, 
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in the instant case the only income-producing property awarded to the 
Plaintiff is the $25, 000. 00 savings certificate. 
What the Defendant failed to accomplish in the Trial Court with his 
theory of forfeiture (denial of alimony to the Plaintiff), he now seeks to 
accomplish by urging this Court that Plaintiff should be forced to live on 
the income that could be produced from the value of the property awarded 
to her. In order to support this position, the Defendant urges this Court to 
impose a trust upon the Plaintiff, funded with money derived from the forced 
sale of the Carmel home where she now resides. There is absolutely no 
credible evidence in the record which would support the imposition of a 
trust upon the property awarded to the Plaintiff and had the Defendant 
informed Plaintiff and the Court (other than in his closing argument) that 
the question of imposing a trust upon Plaintiff was being tried, the Plaintiff 
could have introduced testimony to rebut any evidence which could infer-
entially support Defendant's position. 
As in the Trial Court, the Defendant on this appeal urges this Court 
to deny the wife alimony without giving any consideration to the needs of the 
Plaintiff or asserting any evidence to show that the Defendant is unable to 
pay the amount of alimony awarded to the Plaintiff by the Trial Court. 
The award of alimony was equitable and as set forth above, the 
facts of this case fully support the Trial Court's award of alimony. 
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POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES, .. 
COSTS TO THE PLAINTIFF, A •., 
Plaintiff fully concurs with the Defendant in his Brief, wher,. 
he states: 
Section 30-3-3, U,C.A., 1953, permits an award tothewue 
or to a husband, of money with which to prosecute, or defot: 
an action in divorce. The statute, this Court has said, does 
not contemplate that the award for expenses of litigation she. 
be made only in those cases where the adverse party, usu;:: 
the wife, is destitute or practically so, but rather when, in 
sound discretion of the Court, the circumstances of the par~. 
are such that in fairness to the wife, she should be given fins: 
assistance by the husband in her prosecution or defense oft:· 
action. (Appellant's Brief, page 48-49). 
The facts in this matter clearly support an award of attorne•. 
to the Plain tiff. 
At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the Plaintiffr.a: 
incurred attorney's fees totaling $14, 920. 00, (R. 592, 594), which sum 
included $2, 500. 00 Plaintiff owed for previous attorneys in this malie: 
(R. 163) Of the $14, 920. 00 that Plaintiff had incurred in attorney'sk 
the Court awarded her $8, 000. 00 attorney's fees. 
This matter required extensive disc ave ry, necessitated in!:· 
the Defendant's own conduct. This fact is clearly illustrated by the:. 
in which Defendant answered the first set of Interrogatories propounco 
him. d d dAnswersto~ (Answers to Interrogatories, R. 34, an Amen e 
rogatories, R. 44). · the Deie:: In his Answer to those Interrogatories, 
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stated that the mortgage on the home at Cortez Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
was $30, 000. 00, when, in fact, the mortgage was $15, 000. 00 (Exhibit 34-D); 
he stated that the lots owned in Park City were a joint venture when, in fact, 
he owned the lots himself (R. 25); and he stated that he owned a one-half 
interest in the $100, 000. 00 savings certificate at Silver King Bank, when, 
in fact, he was the sole owner of the savings certificates (R. 11, 12). It 
should also be noted that the Trial Court required Plaintiff to pay her own 
expert witness fees (Finding, Record l24). 
In the case of Dubois v. Dubois (Supra), the wife who was granted 
the divorce and awarded 60% of the marital estate valued at $588, 581. 00 
was also awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $10, 000. 00, which this 
Court held was not an abuse of discretion. 
The Trial Court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff was within 
its discretion, was fair to the parties, and was supported by the evidence. 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES 
FOR THIS APPEAL. 
Although the Plaintiff was not awarded, in full, the property and 
alimony that she requested at the trial (Exhibit 24-P and Exhibit 66-P), the 
Plaintiff chose not to appeal the Trial Court's decision. However, the 
Defendant did choose to appeal the Trial Court's decision and as a result 
the Plaintiff has had to incur substantial attorney's fees. 
Section 30-3-3, U. C. A. (1953), provides that the Court can award 
attorney's fees and this Court has held that a reasonable attorney's fee may 
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-be awarded on appeal. See Anderson v. Anderson (Supra) H d .. ,~ 
Hendricks (Supra), Peterson v. Peterson, llZ Utah 54Z, L89 P.Zd 9t. 
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees c, on tuis Appe: 
and this case should be remanded to the District Court for a determi:. 
of the amount of the attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court in this case rendered its decision with cons:: 
ation given to all of the facts and consideration; involved in this case, 
including the conduct of each of the parties. 
In light of all of the facts and circumstances, the Trial Cou:: 
formulated a Decree that was equitable to eac.h of the parties. TheD:.j 
was awarded property valued at $450, 000. 00, which included his man. 
investments and the corporation which is capable of generating subsli.: 
income to him. The division of assets allows Defendant to continuet 
life in a manner virtually undisturbed from what it was prior to thedi 
The Decree awarded to Plaintiff property valued at $200,00u. 
which included the home in Carmel, California, where the Plaintilfdi: 
to reside. The Decree allows Plaintiff an opportunity to continue to:: 
struct her life in Carmel. 
The Trial Court's award of alimony to Plaintiff was basedu:: 
bTt of Defei: her need, in light of her standard of living, and on the a l l Y 
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to pay such alimony. The award of alimony permits Plainti££ to recon-
struct her life on a happy and useful basis. 
The Decree of the Trial Court should be affirmed in its entirety 
and Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney's fees on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK C. McLACHLAN 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
RALPH J. HAFEN 
924 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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-~~ll_~LE.:..L~~~_E__2_E __ ~~ll-~L~~-
r hereby certify I served three (3) copies of the foregoing 
Respondent's Brief, by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Joel 
M. Allred, Attorney for Defendant, Appellant, at 345 South State Stree: 
Suite 101, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ___ day of March, 1978, 
MARK C. McLACHLAN 
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